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As the specialized agency for agriculture of
the Inter-American system, IICA has
considered the subject of the world trade in
agricultural products and the related
negotiations in the international arena as a
priority and a matter for continuous follow-
up.
It is no coincidence, then, that with the
inclusion of agriculture in the multilateral
trade negotiations, commencing with the
Uruguay Round of GATT, our Institute has
adapted its cooperation activities to respond
to the new realities generated by these
negotiations for the continent’s agricultural
sector.
Since the early nineties, IICA has made a
growing contribution to the strengthening
of the professional and institutional capacities
of its member countries, to enable them to
participate in the negotiations on agriculture,
and to meet the challenges and take
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advantage of the opportunities offered by the
agreements signed. With the Institute’s technical
cooperation, analytical documents and information
networks on the negotiations and agreements have
been generated; regional consultation and
coordination mechanisms have been developed;
several thousand public officials and private sector
specialists from all over the continent have received
information and training; and, offices specialized in
trade policy and agricultural negotiations have
been created and consolidated in many of the
region’s Ministries of Agriculture.
With the launch of a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar, in November of
2001, in the context of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and known as the Doha
Development Agenda, this issue has taken on a
new dimension and priority for IICA, consistent
with our commitment to the development of
agriculture and of the continent’s rural
populations. Based on an understanding that trade
should serve the development and well-being of
our nations, especially of our rural sectors, our
concern is that these negotiations should
adequately reflect the objectives and interests of
the countries of the region.
Consequently, under this administration IICA has
intensified its cooperation efforts on the issues
covered by the agricultural negotiations and on
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, through a
series of activities in the hemispheric, regional and
national spheres, many of these in alliance with
other international organizations, such as the
WTO itself, IDB/INTAL, ECLAC, ALADI,
SIECA, CARICOM and FAO, to mention just a
few, uniting efforts in this endeavor to support our
countries.
We have also made this topic an important part of
the institutional discussion. Indeed, the current
status of and outlook for the agricultural
negotiations at the WTO was one of the central
themes of the Annual Strategic Planning Meeting,
held with all the Representatives of IICA in San
Jose, Costa Rica, in October 2005. We invited Dr.
Carlos Pérez del Castillo, a distinguished
international authority on agricultural
negotiations, to be the keynote speaker at this
event and to explore this subject. 
On that occasion, he offered an in-depth analysis
of the status of the WTO negotiations with regard
to the three main pillars of the negotiation -Export
Competition; Domestic Support and Market
Access- and Special and Differential Treatment in
favor of Developing Countries, while also
attempting to envisage the possible outcomes of
this important negotiating process for IICA’s
member countries.
Given the implications that the results of
December’s WTO Ministerial Conference, in
Hong Kong, will have for our region’s agriculture
and rural population, we considered it important
to entrust Dr. Pérez del Castillo with the
preparation of a document summarizing the main
aspects of his presentation and the thoughts shared
on that occasion. 
In the following pages we are pleased to present
the results of that work, as a contribution by IICA
to the analysis of and the search for international
agreements that will enable us to advance towards
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Introduction
This document was prepared during the last week
of October and the first week of November 2005,
just five weeks prior to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in
Hong Kong, when serious doubts persisted over its
concrete results. Clearly, it will be impossible to
achieve the goals originally set by the governments
for the Conference, namely: establishing specific
modalities on the issues of agriculture and
industrial products; improved offers on services;
significant advances on rules and on cotton; and
solutions to development issues, particularly
special and differential treatment and
implementation.
At this point, it is difficult to predict the final
contents of the Ministerial Declaration that will be
adopted at the Conference. My personal opinion is
that the lessons of Cancun have been learnt and
that wisdom will surely prevail. No government
wishes to repeat a failure, which would have
serious repercussions for the future of the
negotiations and for the credibility of the
multilateral trading system and of the WTO itself.
My feeling is that a formula will surely be found so
that the results may be internationally perceived as
a step forward – perhaps insufficient – but in the
right direction. A declaration that reflects the
progress made to date in different fields, that
reaffirms the commitments already agreed upon -
or those that might be obtained in the period up
to and during the Conference itself- and is
complemented with policy guidelines, directives,
and certainly new deadlines, to resolve the pending
problems. Finally, it must also include a
reaffirmation of the political commitment to
conclude the Round at the end of 2006.
For the past several months I have publicly stated
that the important thing is not what may happen
in Hong Kong, which is only a stage in the
negotiation process, but rather what we can
expect at the end of the Round. Therefore, I am
not unduly concerned or discouraged about what
might happen or not happen in this Sixth
Ministerial Conference. It is important to
emphasize this point, because it is clearly reflected
in the contents of this work, which does not stop
in Hong Kong, but looks ahead to the future.
Here, we will discuss only the status of and
outlook for the agricultural negotiations,
although we are conscious of their links with other
areas of the negotiation. When we consider the
possible results for agriculture at the end of the
Round, we are very much aware of the “single
undertaking” commitment that characterizes
these negotiations.
Having followed the negotiation process very
closely since its inception, particularly in my
capacity as Chairman of the WTO General
Council during the period February 2003-
February 2004, I am cautiously optimistic about
the possibility of achieving a satisfactory outcome
by the end of 2006, or beginning of 2007. This,
of course, would require all the parties to maintain
their level of ambition and finally decide to
grapple with an element that has been lacking
until now: the genuine search for common
ground and convergence of positions, without
which no result is possible. Obviously, it will be
necessary to translate statements of good intent
into concrete actions at the negotiating table. It
will also demand courage, leadership and the
political will to achieve results that reflect the
interests of all.
Many of the possible outcomes that I mention in
this document are not the result of proposals or
positions that we have heard in recent weeks from
some important WTO Members, both from
developed and developing countries. An objective
assessment of these, will confirm that they were
already reflected in previous documents published
by this author a long time ago. For example, in the
document I presented to the Fifth Ministerial
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Conference of Cancun (Job (03)/150/Rev.1), as
Chairman of the General Council, I proposed
setting Blue Box limits in two phases, finally
capping this support at around 2.5% of the value
of each country’s total agricultural production; a
50% reduction in de minimis domestic support,
the elimination of the safeguard clause for
developed countries and the elimination of all
types of export subsidies.  After the failure of
Cancun, in the document (Job (03) 226)
submitted as Chairman to the WTO General
Council Meeting in December 2003, I suggested
the convenience of envisaging in  these
negotiations,  a second phase of reduction
commitments by governments, towards
eliminating the Amber Box. Likewise, I
suggested a way to approach the cotton
negotiation. This set of possible outcomes
suggested for the current agricultural
negotiations, were also the subject of public
statements and publications prior to this work.
(In this regard see the author’s contribution to
the book: Solution of Inter-Governmental
Disputes, published by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), in 2004, with the
title: Agricultural Protectionism and the
Multilateral Negotiations in the WTO).
The vision presented here of the possible
outcomes of this negotiation stems from the
intense process of consultations and
“confessional” dialogues, which as Chairman of
the General Council, I held with all Members, at
the highest level, before and after the Ministerial
Conference of Cancun. It is therefore based on a
realistic appraisal of the scope and possible limits
of the negotiation.
Although the situation has evolved since then, in
terms of concrete proposals formulated by some
Members in relation to certain issues, in my view,
there have been no major changes regarding
what we considered at that time, as  possible
outcomes of the negotiation.
I.  Background
Until the launch of the Uruguay Round, in 1986,
agriculture had been practically sidelined from the
trade liberalization processes set in motion by
GATT, since its creation in 1947, through seven
Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
During those four decades, very significant tariff
reductions were introduced for manufactured
goods and industrial and high technology
products in the world economy and  rules and
disciplines governing their international trade were
established. However, during this same period we
also witnessed a resurgence of protectionism in
agriculture in the industrialized countries and the
introduction of a sophisticated arsenal of barriers
and  distortions of various kinds, that profoundly
affected production and international trade in that
sector.
With the adoption of the Agreement on
Agriculture, the Uruguay Round took the first
positive step towards integrating this sector more
fully into the multilateral trading system. The
result was a first level of access to what had been,
until then, highly protected markets. The
Agreement defined and classified the different
types of domestic support for agricultural
production,  limits were established, and  certain
reductions within specific deadlines were agreed
upon. It also established limits and certain
reductions in relation to export subsidies.   
Nevertheless, the results of the Uruguay Round
fell very far short of the expectations of countries
that were efficient agricultural producers. At the
end of the implementation period for these
results, in the year 2000, the average tariff
protection for agricultural products was still six
times higher than for industrial products. Ad
valorem, tariff peaks of 200% and 300% were
commonplace and, in the case of rice, tariffs of
nearly 1000 % were recorded. In addition, access
for products with a higher level of processing
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continued to be hindered by harmful tariff
escalation.
Total support to agricultural production in the
OECD2 countries, also remained at impressive
levels. In the year 2000, this figure was estimated
at 360 billion US dollars -in other words-, at 1
billion US dollars per day.
That figure has been reduced slightly in recent
years, the estimate for 2004 being 345 billion US
dollars. Official support represents, on average,
30% of producers’ income in the OECD
countries, ranging from 20% in the United States
to 34% in the European Union, 60% in Japan and
Korea and 70% in Iceland, Norway and
Switzerland.
To understand the significance and scale of this
figure, we should recall that it represents 74% of
the total value of exports of goods from all the
Latin American and Caribbean countries (or
127%, if we exclude Mexico). It is nine times
higher than the total flows of Direct Foreign
Investment that entered the region in 2004, and
six times greater than the total sum of Official
Development Assistance that all developing
countries receive annually. We are therefore
talking about very important figures, that have
seriously affected and distorted the production
and trade of countries that are efficient
agricultural producers at world level.
By the end of the Uruguay Round, this
unsatisfactory situation, led to an agreement, as a
part of the overall negotiating package, that
agriculture – together with services – would be
subject to new  negotiations,  beginning in
January 2000, in what was termed “mandated
negotiations”. 
These negotiations resumed at the WTO in
February 2000. However, it soon became clear
that it would be very difficult to undertake an
ambitious process of liberalization and reform in
the agricultural sector outside the framework of a
new Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
with broader coverage and scope than the
mandated negotiations, which would cover the
interests of all the parties.  This was especially true
of the developed countries with protectionist
agricultural policies that, for political reasons,
needed to obtain certain gains in priority sectors
of interest to them, in order to be able to grant
concessions on agricultural issues. Thus, the
WTO Members finally agreed to work together
towards the launch of a new Round, an objective
achieved in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, with
the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration
known as the Doha Development Agenda.
II.  The Doha mandate
on agriculture
In the Ministerial Declaration adopted in Doha,
Member governments agreed to pursue
comprehensive negotiations on agriculture aimed
at achieving: “substantial improvements in market
access; reductions of all forms of export subsidies,
with a view to phasing them out; and substantial
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support”.
Furthermore, they also agreed that “special and
differential treatment for developing countries
shall be an integral part of all elements of the
negotiations”, and that “non-trade concerns will
be taken into account in the negotiations as
provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture”.
The Declaration stipulated that the modalities for
reform would be established no later than 31
March 2003, and that the negotiations would
conclude no later than 1 January 2005.
Overall, the results of this agreement on
agricultural issues may be viewed as positive and
satisfactory. The Doha Mandate is both
comprehensive and ambitious, and gives a clear
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direction on the fundamental reforms to be
followed in this sector. It also provides a good
foundation for correcting, reducing or eliminating
the numerous restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets.
This document does not attempt to offer a detailed
account of developments in the agricultural
negotiations from the launch of the Round to the
present date. However, in this brief summary of
the situation we should note that, immediately
after the Doha Conference, major difficulties
surfaced that made progress very difficult. In the
first place, the European Union’s (EU) current
reform of its Common Agricultural Policy
prevented this block from submitting a concrete
proposal on agricultural negotiations at the
multilateral level, until late in 2003. Secondly, the
Farm Bill adopted by the United States Congress
at the beginning of 2002, with its protectionist
principles that were diametrically opposed to the
Doha Mandate of trade liberalization, dealt
another hard blow to these negotiations. The
failure to meet all the deadlines agreed to give
priority to the interests of developing countries on
the question of special and differential treatment
and implementation, did not contribute to a
scenario conducive to trade liberalization. The
developed countries’ insistence on putting
agriculture -sidelined from serious GATT/WTO
negotiations for more than fifty years- on an equal
footing with new topics for negotiation of interest
to them, such as investment, competition,
government procurement and trade facilitation,
did not help this task either.
As a result, we experienced the inevitable failure of
the Cancun Conference in September of 2003.
After an intense consultation process, the
negotiations were re-launched, culminating in the
July 2004 Framework Agreement, which
revitalized the process. However, this progress was
short-lived. A series of problems, both technical
and political, surfaced once again and, together
with a lack of leadership by the main trading
partners, led to the stalling of the negotiations and
considerably delayed the agreed deadlines. It was
not until the beginning of October 2005, just a
few weeks prior to the Hong Kong Conference,
when we began to perceive clear signals, in the
form of concrete proposals, that the levels of
ambition consistent with the Doha mandate still
persist -at least among some important Members-
to move the agricultural negotiations forward. In
the Introduction of this document, I have already
referred to the possible outcomes of the Sixth
Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, in the
coming month of December.
Having established the general framework that has
characterized the negotiations as a whole so far, I
will now discuss the agricultural negotiations in
greater depth.
III.  Current situation 
and outlook for the      
agricultural negotiations
The three fundamental pillars of the agricultural
negotiations are: export competition; domestic
support and market access. As mentioned
previously, special and differential treatment in
favor of developing countries will be an integral
part of these negotiations.
Below we offer an analysis of the current status of
the negotiation on each of these three pillars and
some views on the prospects and possible
outcomes.
A. Export competition
For the purposes of the negotiation, this pillar
includes four issues that must be addressed: export
subsidies; export credits; food aid; and state
6
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
7
trading enterprises (STDs), together with special
and differential treatment in favor of developing
countries.
1. Subvenciones a la exportación
Export subsidies are generally cited as the
agricultural policy measures with the greatest
trade-distorting effects. Their use, mostly by a
small number of developed countries, reduces and
destabilizes international market prices, displaces
efficient producers from their traditional markets,
depresses the incomes of efficient producer
countries that rely on these commodities for their
growth and development and has a negative impact
on investment and the modernization of
agriculture in those countries. Finally, these
measures discourage domestic production in many
developing countries that are now food importers,
but have a clear potential as agricultural producers.
Only 25 of the WTO’s 144 current Members
maintain agricultural export subsidies on their
Commitments Lists. Since the early 1990s, the use
of export subsidies has gradually declined, though
the effectiveness of this reduction has been relative.
This is partly due to the extremely high baseline on
which they are calculated and to the reorientation
of these subsidies towards other types of trade-
distorting support in the main protectionist
countries. In 2002, according to notifications
received at the WTO, the subsidy level was
estimated at around US$ 6 billion. The downward
trend continued in the following years and it is
currently estimated at around US 2.3 billion. This
mechanism is used mainly by the EU (more than
90% of the total), Norway and Switzerland, among
others, and most subsidies are concentrated in a
few product categories (sugar, milk products,
meats and grains). According to estimates by
ABARE (Australia), eliminating export subsidies
would make it possible to increase global
agricultural income by around  US 3.4 billion
dollars annually.
There is no reason to continue applying export
subsidies in the agricultural sector and their
elimination will be a very important step towards
reducing current levels of protection, with their
market-distorting effects. GATT prohibited export
subsidies for industrial products more than forty
years ago. Price and quality are the only fair means
of export competition and the promotion of
exports through subsidized prices or  payment
conditions is an unfair trading practice. Doing
away with such practices would help to bring
agriculture into line with the rules and disciplines
already applied to other tradable goods in the
WTO, thereby ending more than 50 years of
discrimination in the treatment of agriculture. The
fact that subsidies have been reduced in recent
years, provides sufficient arguments to agree upon
their complete elimination, within a brief  period,
in the course of the current negotiations.
Nevertheless -and with good reason- a group of
countries led by the European Union considers
that this issue is very closely linked with the
treatment that should be given to other types of
export competition with distorting effects similar
to export subsidies, which are examined below.
There should be a very close parallelism in the
commitments adopted on all forms of export
subsidies.
2. Export Credits, Guarantees 
and Insurance Programs
Under this heading we include officially –
supported export credit operations, export credit
guarantees and export insurance programs for
agricultural products. The current negotiations do
not seek to eliminate export credits in international
agricultural trade. The aim is to eliminate any
hidden subsidy elements, since their use, like
export subsidies, constitutes unfair competition.
Several countries, particularly industrialized ones,
use this mechanism to boost the competitiveness of
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their agricultural exports. Although no official
information is available at the WTO on total levels of
exports that benefit from this type of subsidy, it is
estimated that between US$ 6 and US$ 8 billion
worth of agricultural exports benefit from this form
of official support. The United States is the main
country to engage in these practices (more than 50%
of the total). It is estimated that export credits
amounted to some 3.2 billion dollars in 2001. The
latest figure available for the EU at the OECD
shows that in 1998, export credits were of the order
of 1.15 billion dollars.
The purpose of the new disciplines to be
incorporated into the Agreement would be to
ensure that export credits reflect market practices,
thereby avoiding any type of subsidy. These might
include terms and conditions such as a maximum
period of 180 days for the reimbursement of export
credits (both capital and interest); certain
percentages of cash payments; interest rates that
reflect internationally recognized indicative lists,
adjusted for the risk of each operation; etc.
3. Food Aid
The current WTO negotiations do not set out to
redefine the concept of food aid or to incorporate
measures that might compromise the provision of
such assistance in cases of emergency or
humanitarian need. Rather, it is a matter of
differentiating genuine aid from the use of this
instrument to offload surpluses or to develop new
markets. This is a common practice that has
displaced traditional suppliers from many of their
markets, resulting in unfair competition                   
Food Aid accounts for a small percentage of world
agricultural trade, but may have a very negative
impact on certain products (powdered milk, grains).
The United States is the main provider of this type
of assistance, contributing 63% of the total.
The goal of the negotiations on this issue would be to
agree on rules and disciplines to prevent food aid
from being used as a means to circumvent export
subsidy commitments. Among the proposals
submitted are the following: that food assistance
should only take the form of grants; that aid must not
be “tied” to other commercial transactions; and that
aid should be granted based on requests by the
relevant international organizations. There have also
been calls for aid to be provided through cash
donations only. To this end, the transparency and
notification system regarding food aid must be
strengthened within the WTO.  Any support that
does not comply with the agreed disciplines should be
considered as an export subsidy and treated
accordingly.
4. State Trading Enterprises (STEs)
The inclusion of State Trading Enterprises (STEs) –
both exporters and importers – under the heading
of export competition stems from the fact that, given
the monopolistic status or the exclusive rights and
privileges granted to these enterprises, their
operations can distort trade. Since the aim of these
negotiations is to eliminate all forms of subsidies, it is
essential to agree on specific disciplines and
notification systems to guarantee that STEs are not
used to circumvent export subsidy commitments. The
negotiations do not seek to suppress STEs, but rather
to create a more propitious climate that encourages
private competition and ensure that their operations
adapt to market practices.
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are the main
countries that use STEs.
5. Special and Differential Treatment
in favor of Developing Countries
In recent years there have been very few
cases of developing countries subsidizing their
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
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agricultural exports. These countries have
other development priorities in their budgets
and do not have sufficient resources to
compete with the treasuries of the industrialized
nations. Export subsidies are unfair, harmful and
detrimental both to developed and developing
countries, and should therefore be eliminated,
wherever they appear. In the context of
preferential treatment, a developing country
that justifies its use, could be granted a somewhat
longer period than industrialized countries
to eliminate subsidies.
Possible Outcomes of the Negotiations
in Relation to Export Competition
We are convinced that in this Round it is feasible and viable to definitively eliminate all forms of
export competition mentioned previously. Achieving this objective is imperative for the conclusion of
the Round.
The question is, in how many years can this elimination be achieved? We believe it is reasonable to
agree on a period of five years. There are products in which these measures could be eliminated
immediately, whereas other more politically sensitive products may require rather longer periods. 
We consider that several recent studies by the World Bank, UNCTAD and other organizations have
minimized the importance of eliminating export subsidies, suggesting that this trade liberalization
would not bring greater benefits to developing countries and would not impact the growth of trade.
These outcomes are surely the result of amalgamating all developing countries, net exporters and
importers, under the same roof. We are convinced that the elimination of subsidies will have
important results for many countries that are efficient producers of certain products (milk products,
meats, rice and grains).
B.  Domestic Support
The disciplines that regulate domestic support,
agreed upon in the Uruguay Round, distinguish
between forms of domestic support with
production and trade-distorting effects (Amber
Box and Blue Box) and those that supposedly have
zero or minimal distorting effects (Green Box).
The Amber Box, quantified in the Total Aggregate
Measurement of Support (AMS), was the only one
in which reductions (20% in 5 years) were agreed
during that Round. The Blue Box, which covers
supports provided in the context of  production
limiting programs was not included in the
commitments to reduce domestic support. The
Green Box was also exempted from reductions.
As previously indicated, the reductions agreed in
the Uruguay Round were very modest. The
OECD has confirmed that support to farmers in
industrialized countries is currently approaching
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Table 1 
Amber Box: Bound levels in WTO and expeditures notified in the last year







Source: prepared by the autor with WTO data
the high levels that prevailed prior to the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
That support, provided mainly by some rich
developed countries, encourages inefficient
production that competes unfairly with that of
other efficient producers, particularly developing
countries, and seriously distorts world agricultural
trade.
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this Round is
to significantly reduce domestic supports that
distort agricultural production or trade. Let us
analyze the prospects in the different Boxes.
1.  Amber Box
These measures undoubtedly cause the greatest
distortion to world agricultural trade, since their
provision is directly linked to production and/or
support to domestic prices that are well above
international levels.
Table 1 shows the Bound levels as well as the
notified expenditures in that Box.
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The Doha Round seeks to achieve significant
reductions in this Box through a tiered formula,
whereby Members with the highest levels of
support make the greatest efforts towards
reduction, in order to achieve a harmonized result
among the different countries that protect their
agriculture.
The European Union is the main user of this Box,
and must therefore implement greater levels of
reduction.
2.  De minimis
Under the “de minimis” concept, countries may
provide support to specific products, for a value
not exceeding 5% of the total value of the
production of that product (or 10% for developing
countries). Domestic supports that are not for
specific products may also be granted, for a value
not exceeding 5% of total agricultural production
(10% for developing countries).
Table 2 shows the bound and notified levels in
relation to this type of domestic support.
The objective of this Round would be to achieve
significant reductions in these supports in
developed countries. Developing countries should
be exempt from reductions. It should be
emphasized that in recent years, very few
developing countries have exceeded the levels of
support permitted through “de minimis”, which
suggests that this type of support should, in
principle, be sufficient to address the rural sector
needs of their respective countries. It is important
to emphasize this point, since it should encourage
developing countries to assume more proactive
positions than at present regarding the elimination
or substantive reduction of other types of trade-
distorting domestic support, practiced by
industrialized countries.
It should be pointed out that the USA is the main
user of this type of domestic support.
Table 2 
De minimis
(US$ billions of dollars)
Total Value
Agricultural Production
EU 257 0.3 25.6
USA 185 7.4 18.4
Japan 84 2.4 8.4
Norway 1.9 n/d 0.2
Suitzwerland 4.9 n/d 0.4
Source: prepared by the autor with WTO data.
* Includes 5% specific products and 5% non-specific products.






3.  Blue Box
This covers governmental supports provided in the
context of programs to limit production (area
cultivated or heads of livestock). This type of
domestic support was exempt from reductions in
the Uruguay Round. Its application showed that the
restrictions contemplated did not necessarily have an
impact on the reduction of production levels. In
practice, this type of support, like the Amber Box,
has distorted the production and trade of efficient
producer countries. 
This Round would seek to cap this type of support.
There have been proposals to set a maximum limit
of 5% of the average value of the total agricultural
production of the country that applies it. There are
also current proposals (coinciding with those
originally presented by the author) to reduce this
limit to 2.5%.
It is interesting to note that the USA has not used
this type of support in the past and that capping it
would enable it to displace part of its current
supports from other boxes to the Blue Box.
Similarly, it should be noted that the July
Framework Agreement opens up the possibility of
extending the scope of this type of measure to
supports not necessarily linked to production limits,
which increases the complexity of the negotiation
on this Box.
4.  Green Box
This box contains domestic support measures that
supposedly have no or minimal distorting effects on
production or trade. This box was exempted from
reductions in the Uruguay Round.
The Green Box includes government services
programs such as research, inspection, pest control,
marketing, infrastructure, and stock accumulation
for food security. It also covers -and this is where
critics challenge its supposed non-distortion- direct
payments to producers and income supports in
Table 3 
Blue Box
(US$ billion of dollars)
Total Value
Agricultural Production
EU 257 22 12.8 6.4
USA 185 0 9.2 4.6
Japan 84 0.8 4.2 2.1
Norway 1.,9 0.8 0.1 0.04
Suitzerland 4.9 n/d 0.2 0.1
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Table 4  
Green box
(US$ billions of dollars)






Source: prepared by the autor witn WTO data.
certain circumstances; structural readjustment
assistance, and environmental and rural-
development provisions.
In the Doha Round, it is expected that the
criteria for this box will be reexamined
with a view to ensuring that its impact
has zero or minimal effects on international
trade.
It should be noted that the United States is the
main user of this box.
5.  Special and Differential Treatment in
favor of Developing Countries
The negotiations acknowledge the importance of
incorporating concrete provisions on the issue of
special and differential treatment in favor of
developing countries, in particular the least
developed countries (LDCs) and those that are
net food importers. These provisions should
enable the aforementioned countries to address
their legitimate needs, including agricultural and
rural development, food security, subsistence
agriculture and small-scale agriculture to promote
national food production.
The least-developed countries would be exempt
from reductions in relation to domestic support.
It is also considered important that special and
differential treatment should envisage smaller
reductions and longer implementation periods for
developing countries than the ones agreed for
developed countries. De minimis support would
not be subject to reductions and would remain at
current levels for developing countries.
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Possible Outcomes of the Negotiations 
in relation to Domestic Support
We consider that at this point in time, the situation is not as clear regarding possible results as in the
case of export subsidies. However, we venture to predict that this Round will yield significant
reductions in the area of domestic trade-distorting support, although they will surely not meet the
expectations that prevailed at the beginning of the negotiations.
We consider it entirely feasible to achieve initial reductions in the Amber Box in the order of 70% for
the European Union, and 60% for the United States. The viability of this reduction over a five-year
period is based on the fact that it starts off from higher bound levels at the WTO for this type of
support than those applied at present, and that the aforementioned reductions can easily be
accommodated within the domestic reforms that have already been agreed upon domestically. It
cannot be ruled out that the level of ambition regarding this item may increase somewhat in the
course of the negotiations.
But, in our opinion, what is important in these multilateral negotiations is an awareness that
whatever is agreed or not agreed upon in this Round will affect world agricultural production and
trade for the next 15 years. Hence we support, as we indicated already in December 2003 (see JOB
(03) 226), raising the levels of ambition of these negotiations. We are aware, but not concerned, that
this position will require longer periods for implementing the commitments made. Consequently, we
believe it is legitimate to propose in these negotiations the above mentioned percentages of reduction
for the Amber Box with a first implementation phase of the results over a five year period. However,
our comprehensive proposal is to negotiate the continuation of the aforementioned reforms, with
additional reductions in the Amber Box, leading to their total elimination in a second additional
phase of five years (in short, the elimination of the Amber Box in 10 years).
With respect to de minimis support, our original suggestion (of September 2003) was a 50%
reduction for developed countries, and maintaining the current obligations of developing countries
without modifications. It is duly noted that the situation has evolved in recent weeks. The European
Union’s recent proposals suggest reducing the aforementioned support by 80% for developed countries.
We consider it rational to support the aforementioned proposals, although doubts remain regarding
the level of acceptance among other developed trade partners that use them. 
With respect to the Blue Box, my position at the Cancun Conference as Chairman of the General
Council was in favor of a reduction in two stages. The first would come down to 5% of the total value
of agricultural production in the first five years of implementation of the commitments, followed by
another reduction to 2.5% of the value of agricultural production over the following five years. I note
with satisfaction that many countries at present share this point of view.
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Possible Outcomes of the Negotiations 
in relation to Domestic Support
From a pragmatic point of view, we consider our original position viable. The countries that use the
Blue Box and whose supports are at present higher than the intended limits (the European Union,
Norway) should make a commitment to lower their supports to 5% of the value of agricultural
production over 5 years, followed by an additional reduction to 2.5% of the value of production in
the following five years. For example, in the case of the European Union, this would mean moving
from current levels of support in the order of 22 billion dollars to 12.8 billion in the first five years,
and to 6.4 billion in ten years.
This procedure should not necessarily apply to all countries. It is not a question, in these negotiations,
of providing opportunities for increasing protectionism. The United States, which at present does not
use this box, should be content to commit itself to a cap of 2.5% of its total agricultural production.
The same should apply to other countries whose supports, through this box, do not reach that limit at
present.
As to the Green Box, I think that the priority in this round of negotiations should be guaranteeing
the commitment of all parties to make a serious effort to determine objectively the criteria needed to
ensure that the measures adopted within this box will have no or minimal effects on worldwide
agricultural production or trade. Those measures that do not conform to this criterion would be put
into other boxes and subject to the corresponding reductions.
If we should obtain these results in the domestic support pillar, we would be ensuring that the Overall
Trade Distorting  Support, which in this Round covers the Amber, Blue, and de minimis boxes, will
decrease by very significant percentages with respect to the levels bounded at present in the WTO. (In
the most optimistic scenario, these supports would decrease from 96 billion dollars in the European
Union to 19.2 billion; in the most pessimistic scenario, to only 40.8 billion dollars. For the United
States, the equivalent figures would go from 29 billion dollars to 13.4 billion or 21.4 billion
respectively).
It would be utopian to think that the current negotiations are going to put an end to all types of
government support for agricultural production in developed countries. For a variety of reasons,
more social and political than economic, these will remain, by the end of the Round, at high levels,
although the kind of support (directed more at supporting income than prices) will generate fewer
distortions in international trade. 
The following table provides an approximation of what the possible results of these negotiations might
be on the issue of domestic support.
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Table 5 
Possible Results in Reductions in Domestic Support




EU 12.8* 6.41 21.62 40.8 73.3 96.0
12.8* 6.41 03 19.2 73.3 96.0
USA 9.2* 4.61 7.6ª 21.4 24.4 29.0
9.2* 4.61 03 13.8 24.4 29.0
JAPAN 4.2* 2.11 14.8ª 21.1 n.d.# 41.3
4.2* 2.11 03 6.3 n.d. 41.3
NORWAY 0.1* 0.041 0.5ª 0.6 1.2 1.4
0.1* 0.041 03 0.1 1.2 1.4
SUITZERLAND 0.2* 0.11 1.0 1.3 2.2 2.5
0.2* 0.11 0 0.3 2.2 2.5
Source: Prepared by the author based on WTO data. 
a Reduction of 50%
1) Reduction to 2.5% of the total value of agricultural production
2) Reduction of 70% in 5 years
3) Elimination of the Amber Box in 10 years
a) Reduction of 60% in 5 years


















To the possible bound levels of support as a result of the Doha Round, it would be necessary to
add the amount of Green Box support in order to have a more exact idea of what will continue
to be the level of support for agriculture by industrialized countries. Given the reductions that
will be made in the other boxes, it is likely that Green Box supports could increase with respect
to current levels.
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C.  Market Access
According to all the studies that have been
carried out on the current agricultural
negotiations, in particular those by the United
Nations, the OECD, the World Bank, and
several non-governmental organizations, this is
the area in which trade liberalization would
provide the greatest benefits to all parties, both
in developed and developing countries, and
would have the greatest impact on production
and trade. However, it is the pillar of the
negotiations that has generated the greatest
difficulties, and the one that remains most
behind schedule with respect to the other two
pillars considered previously.
The central objective of the negotiations in this
area is to achieve substantial improvements in
market access for agricultural products. To that
effect, the development of possible modalities in
this area implies steering the negotiations
towards at least five fundamental issues: a
formula for tariff reductions; tariff rate quotas
and their administration; Sensitive products and
Special Products; Special and Differentiated
Treatment in Favor of Developing Countries,
and special safeguard provisions. The issue of
preference erosion should be duly considered in
the aforementioned negotiations.
1. The tariff reduction formula 
With respect to the reduction of customs duties,
a series of difficulties and conflicting issues have
been overcome in the course of the negotiations.
In the first place, it was agreed that negotiations
would be based on bound tariffs, and not on
those currently applied by Members. Similarly,
an understanding was reached that the base for
these negotiations would be ad valorem customs
duties, and formulas were found for the
conversion of specific tariffs to ad valorem
tariffs.
Advances have also been made with respect to a
formula for tariff reduction. The possibility was
considered, but finally discarded, of applying
formulas such as those used in the Uruguay
Round, the Swiss formula, or the Hybrid
formula that emerged from Cancun (known as
the Derbez Text). The negotiators have finally
accepted the notion of a tiered formula with
several bands and thresholds that reflect
different categories of tariff levels. The bands
with the higher customs duties should be subject
to greater reductions.
Considerable progress has also been made in
relation to the concept of setting maximum tariff
caps for agricultural products, in these
negotiations, although significant divergences
remain as to their size.
It is not clear yet if this procedure will be able to
adequately address the problem of tariff
escalation. Nor has there been a decision on the
possibility of complementing tariff reductions
through the tiered formula, with some other
mechanism, such as sectoral initiatives of the 0x0
type.
In principle, positions appear to be converging
toward the definition of four bands. The most
conflictive points remain the establishment of
thresholds for the definition of the bands and
the type of tariff reduction that will be applicable
to each one of these.
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As we can see, the United States is the country that
has embraced the most ambitious position, with
reductions of as much as 90% in the fourth band and
a maximum cap of 75% for agricultural tariffs in
developed countries.
The European Union submitted a much less
ambitious proposal, which in reality proposes a
median reduction of 46%. The Group of 20 has
presented a proposal that is in an intermediate
position between the two major trading partners.
The Group of 10 has stated that it requires greater
flexibility in the formula and does not support the
incorporation of a maximum tariff cap.
To assess the prospects for market access, it is not
enough to examine the proposed formulas for tariff
reduction. These must necessarily be considered in
the light of the positions that these same countries
have adopted with respect to two other intimately
related themes: the treatment that will be granted to
sensitive products and to tariff rate quotas.
2. Sensitive products
The Framework Agreement, agreed in July 2004,
stipulates that Members (both developed and
developing) may designate an appropriate number
of tariff lines, to be negotiated, that will be treated
as sensitive, taking into account the existing
commitments regarding the aforementioned
products.
The ambiguity and lack of precision of this text has
lent itself to various interpretations, which have
adversely affected the negotiation process.
The European Union has indicated that it will rate
160 products, that is 8% of the total of its
agricultural tariff lines (2200 lines in all), as sensitive
products. Similarly, it proposes that these may be
subject to a deviation from a minimum of one-third
to a maximum of two- thirds, of the tariff reduction
agreed in the general formula, for the band into
which the product in question may fall.
The position of the United States, like that of the
G20 and the Cairns Group, is that a small number–
no more than 1% of tariff lines – should be agreed
on as sensitive products. They propose that these
products may be subject to lower tariff reductions
than those agreed upon in the general formula, but
that this should be duly compensated through
expansions in the tariff rate quotas. The G20 has
suggested that developing countries should have the
right to propose 50% more sensitive products than
developed countries (1.5% of tariff lines).
Table 6 
Main proposals for tariff reduction
O– 20 % 55- 65% a b <20 45 <30 25 0<30 35% 0<30 25 
(20-45%) (10-40%)
20– 40% 65- 75% b c 20- 50 55 30- 80 30 >30<60 45% >30<80 30
40– 60% 75- 85% c d 50- 75 65 80- 130 35 >60<90 50% >80<130 35
> 60% 85- 90% d e >75 75 >130 40 >90 60% >130 40
75%* X%* 100%* 150%* 100%* 150%*




Reduction Ad Valorem 
Thresholds
Reduction Ad Valorem 
Thresholds
Reduction Ad Valorem 
Thresholds
Reduction Ad Valorem 
Thresholds
Reduction Ad Valorem 
Thresholds
Reduction
Source: Prepared by the author based on the most recent proposals by Members - October 2005
* Maximum tariff cap
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The G10 considers that Members should have
total discretion in the designation of their sensitive
products. Similarly, it suggests that they should
have the right to raise the number of these
products above the number finally agreed upon by
the parties, insofar as there is willingness to offer a
compensation, such as additional increases in the
tariff rate quotas or more ambitious reductions of
customs duties than those agreed upon in the
general formula for other products.
In a recent study, the World Bank has drawn
attention to the negative effects for market access
that might be caused by the treatment of sensitive
products, indicating that if this concept were
extended to 2% of the tariff lines, 75% of the
potential benefits of a liberalization of world
agricultural trade might be lost. 
3. Tariff Rate Quotas
The ideal situation on the issue of market access
would be to arrive at a regime of low, exclusively
tariff protection, with the progressive elimination
of tariff rate quotas.
However, given the enormous difficulties of
opening markets via tariff reductions, it becomes
indispensable to complement the aforementioned
reductions with significant increases in the quotas,
in order to fulfill the Doha mandate and gain real
market access.
In line with the above, the Cairns Group, the G20
and the United States have proposed increases in
the tariff rate quotas of between 6% and 10% of
the current consumption of the product in the
importing country. It is worth recalling that in the
Uruguay Round a minimum access of 5% of
domestic consumption had been agreed upon.
The proposal by the European Union for
determining tariff rate quotas is based on import
levels and not domestic consumption. This has the
effect of considerably reducing the scale of any
expansion in the aforementioned quotas. At the
same time, it means that the market access
obtained for sensitive products -which are the
ones that will be subject to lower tariff reductions-
through the tariff rate quotas, will be lower than
that obtained for other products. This proposal
also allows those countries with the most
restrictive commercial regimes to grant less access
than those with more liberal regimens.
The determination of tariff rate quotas through
domestic consumption was selected as the key
indicator in the Uruguay Round because it is the
most coherent, is not discriminatory and is the
one that allows for an equitable contribution by all
Members. We consider that this indicator must
continue to be the basis for determining the
expansion of tariff rate quotas in this Round of
negotiations. We cannot see any objective reason
for replacing it with any other basis for calculation.
Furthermore, it is the only indicator that will
enable us to fulfill the Doha mandate for
“substantial improvements in market access”.
In these negotiations it will be also necessary to
introduce rules and disciplines to ensure greater
transparency and effectiveness in the use of tariff
rate quotas. Quota administration should be
aimed at facilitating market access and not at
restricting it, as has been the experience in many
cases. Similarly, we must guarantee that all
suppliers can compete in similar conditions.
4. Special Products
The Framework Agreement of July 2004 resolved
that developing countries would have the
flexibility to designate an appropriate number of
products as Special Products, based on the criteria
of food security, security of the means of
subsistence and rural development needs. A
coalition of developing countries known as the
Group of 33 (G33) is the one that has adopted the
most militant position on this matter. In their
proposal, these countries suggest that they should
have total discretion as to the number of products
in this category and that they should be exempt
from commitments regarding tariff reductions or
the creation or expansion of tariff rate quotas.
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An appreciable number of Members, both
developed and developing countries, while
recognizing that these products must be accorded a
more flexible treatment, have introduced a series of
requirements or criteria that should be taken into
account in the course of the negotiations. First, they
have emphasized the need to limit this treatment to
a very small number of products. Secondly, they
have proposed that these should be concentrated on
agricultural subsistence products, not commercial
products. Thirdly, they have indicated that such
products should not be exempted from tariff
reductions, although these may be lower than the
ones applied to sensitive products. Fourth, they
have proposed that in designating the
aforementioned products, particular attention
should be paid to the existing trade among
developing countries, so as not to harm or limit this
South-South trade. Fifth, they have indicated that
this category of products should be of a provisional
and not a permanent character.
The criteria for establishing this category of
products, together with the treatment they will
receive, are still to be defined within the framework
of the negotiations.
5.  Special safeguard
The Special Safeguard, established in Article 5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, was introduced as a
temporary measure linked to those countries that
had joined the process of “tarification” during the
Uruguay Round. It enabled those countries to limit
the imports of specific products through the
imposition of additional customs duties in the event
of an increase in imports, or a fall in prices, without
the need to prove damages. Once the period to
implement the commitments agreed upon during
the aforementioned Round came to an end, these
measures would be eliminated
In the course of the negotiations, a large majority of
the Membership has defended the elimination of
this safeguard for developed countries and has
advocated the maintenance of a special safeguard
mechanism for developing countries, under
conditions that should be determined in the course
of these negotiations.
In its last proposal, the European Union advocated
the need to preserve special safeguards for the
following products: beef and poultry products;
butter; fruits and vegetables, and sugar.
It has also stated that the protection granted to
wines and spirits in Article 23 of the Agreement on
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights should
extend to all agricultural products. They consider
that this proposal should be an integral part of the
negotiation on market access in these agricultural
negotiations. This proposal has been rejected by a
significant number of Members, considering that
the issue of geographic indications is not part of the
mandate of the negotiations on Agriculture.
6.  Erosion preferences
Ever since the beginning of the Round, a
considerable number of developing countries (the
Group of 90, composed of countries in Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific) that benefit from tariff
preferences in specific markets, have advocated the
maintenance of these preferential margins in the
methodology that is to be agreed on for tariff
reduction.
Any process of trade liberalization, whether
undertaken within the WTO or through bilateral,
regional, hemispheric or preferential agreements
of a diverse nature, automatically entails an
erosion of preferences. This could cause negative
effects in the countries that benefit from them.
In order to attenuate this concern and the costs of
adjustment that these countries face, we must look
for pragmatic solutions in these negotiations. To
that effect, the starting point is to recognize that
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
21
the WTO -one of whose central objective is the
liberalization of trade- can undoubtedly
contribute to the search for possible solutions.
However, a broader response to this problem
will also require the participation and support of
other international organizations with
competence in this area (see below, section on
V)
What the WTO could offer within the
framework of these negotiations is some kind of
compensation for the losses that some products
would incur as a result of preference erosion
(generally products that are not competitive
internationally), through better conditions of
market access for other agricultural products (or
eventually industrial goods or services) of special
interest to these same countries, where they
have comparative advantages or the potential to
develop them.
Clearly, this is not applicable in many instances,
in particular to those small economies
dependent for their revenues on one or two
export products only. In these cases, another
type of possible solution within a broader
framework will have to be considered, as has
already been indicated. 
7.  Last developed countries (LDCs) 
On the subject of market access, the LDCs
will be exempt from tariff reduction
commitments within the framework of these
negotiations.
However, efforts must be made to
effectively integrate these countries into
the multilateral trading system. In that regard,
all developed countries and those developing
countries able to do so, should assume
commitments to grant  tariff and quota
free access  to products originating in
the LDCs.
8.  Special differential treatment in favor 
of developing countries 
With respect to this pillar of market access, in
considering different aspects of the modalities that
are being negotiated, this paper has already
mentioned some of the components of special and
differential treatment in favor of developing
countries. These include different formulas for
tariff reduction, longer terms for the
implementation of the agreed provisions, and
smaller reductions than those of developed
countries.
In improving the opportunities and terms of
access for agricultural products of special interest
to developing countries, the goal must be the
most complete liberalization of the trade in
tropical agricultural products. Similarly, special
importance must be given to products that allow
for the diversification of production, in order to
abandon the crops from which illegal drugs are
produced. 
Similarly, the recognition of special products, the
flexibility in the treatment given to them, and the
maintenance of a special safeguard for developing
countries may also be considered an integral part
of this differential treatment.
Exemptions from commitments in this pillar for
the LDCs and the eventual duty-free access to the
markets of developed countries for the products
originating in the least developed countries must
also be a part of this package. The possible
solutions found to mitigate the negative effects of
the erosion of preferences for the ACP countries
could also be incorporated.
Finally, it should be emphasized that it has been
agreed that the market access negotiations should
pay attention to the particular concerns of





The negotiations on cotton have focused on trade-
related and development-related issues.
As to the trade aspects, and in particular all forms of
export subsidies, the domestic supports that distort
trade and market access are being addressed within
the Agriculture negotiations, and everything that we
have indicated in general terms regarding these
three pillars also applies to cotton. The June 2004
Agreement determined that these aspects should be
treated ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically,
and to that effect a Sub-Committee on Cotton was
established. It should be emphasized that to date no
concrete advances have been made in this matter.
Similarly, although there is general recognition of
the importance of moving forward on the aspects of
the Cotton Initiative that have to do with
development, and a series of activities have been
carried out in this regard, so far there have been no
achievements worthy of mention. 
V. Some preliminary
reflections on the subject 
of the coherence between 
International Organizations 
and the negotiations 
within the WTO
In recent years, the WTO, the IMF and the World
Bank have made efforts to move toward greater
coherence in the formulation of economic policy
worldwide. Similarly, the Bretton Woods
Possible Outcomes of the Negotiations
in relation on the Market Access Pillar
This is surely the pillar where it is hardest to foresee, at this stage of the negotiations, what the
definitive final outcome will be. This will depend, in the end, on the size of the reductions and the
flexibility and exceptions to the general rule that are agreed upon.
In our opinion, the July 2004 Framework Agreement introduced too much flexibility in this pillar
of the negotiations, and this has affected the level of ambition.
Bearing in mind the scale of the defensive interests that are at stake in these negotiations on the
subject of market access (the European Union, the Group of 10, the Group of 90, the Group of 33
and some Members of the G20), we believe that the tariff reduction formula that will be agreed upon
will probably be closer to that proposed by the G20, or somewhere between the positions of the G20 and
of the European Union, than the more ambitious one of the United States. 
As a counterweight, I think that for these negotiations to fulfill the Doha mandate in this pillar, it
will be necessary to modify the most rigid positions with respect to sensitive products and tariff rate
quotas to make these more flexible. This will certainly result in a final agreement that drastically
limits the number of tariff lines for the denomination of sensitive products and contemplates
important increases in  tariff rate quotas.
For the most sensitive products, it is very likely that the improvement in market access will finally
take place through greater increases in tariff rate quotas, rather that through tariff reductions.
It should be reiterated that these conclusions merely reflect the author’s point of view, based on his
direct experience and vision of these negotiations, and do not prejudice anyone¨s position. However,
what is clear, regardless of the final outcome, is that the market access pillar is the one that will
require the greatest efforts and concessions by all parties in order to reach a final agreement.
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Institutions have indicated their willingness to
work with the WTO to resolve problems that
some developing countries that are WTO
Members might encounter when adapting to a
more liberal trade environment, such as the
erosion of trade preferences, the loss of income
from tariffs, or others. 
In the last twelve months, I have been publicly
advocating the need to take this concept of
coherence to a more operational and effective
stage that may help us to solve a series of problems
that require a coordinated response and joint
actions by several international and regional
organizations, taking advantage of their obvious
complementarities.
I have suggested that the future Agreement on
Agriculture that emerges from the current
negotiations could serve as an experimental
platform to develop this new concept. If
successful, this experience could then be extended
to other spheres of the negotiation.
It should be emphasized that the Director General
of IICA assigns special importance to the role that
the Institute, as a development agency, can play in
promoting the above mentioned concept of
coherence, and he has considered it important and
timely that his organization participate actively in
the development and launch of this new approach
to institutional cooperation, as one of the
Institute’s programs. 
With this perspective, I have considered it
pertinent to present in this section a preliminary
outline of the central objective and of some
elements and criteria that could be incorporated
into a proposal in that direction.
In the course of the agricultural negotiations,
several developing countries, many of them
belonging to the less developed nations, have
repeatedly stated that obtaining better market
access conditions in these negotiations would only
provide them with marginal benefits, since they do
not have the capacity to take advantage of these
new opportunities. By way of example, they have
explained that their real agricultural problems
stem from their export supply constraints; their
lack of international competitiveness; their
transport problems and costs related to their
condition as landlocked countries; their
dependence on only one or a few exportable
products, their extreme vulnerability to natural
phenomena and, finally, their dependence on
preferences in their main markets, which could be
eroded in any process of trade liberalization.
As I have mentioned previously, the WTO does
not have the competences or the capacity to
resolve these problems. However, these issues are
very much present and have a direct impact on the
positions adopted by the countries in the
negotiation process.
Organizations such as FAO, UNCTAD, CTI,
IICA, the World Bank, the IMF and others
certainly do have the mandates, human and
financial resources, and technical capacity to
support these countries in the search for solutions
to those problems. But the assistance that they
offer in this regard takes place within a framework
and objectives different to those pursued in
international trade negotiations.  The priorities
may be different, the results are not binding and
finally, in some cases, that assistance may be
subject to conditionalities that greatly exceed the
original objective sought and that may have
additional costs for these countries.
What is proposed in this new operating concept of
“coherence” is simply that, within the framework
of the Agreement on Agriculture that is being
negotiated in the WTO, agreements may not only
be reached regarding commitments, obligations,
provisions and measures to be implemented by the
WTO, but may also be extended to other
international organizations that have the
competences and capacity to implement them. 
If the intention of these negotiations is to take full
The Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) is a specialized agency of the inter-American system,
and its purposes are to encourage and support the efforts of its Member States to foster agricultural development and rural
well-being in their territories.
Its presence in all of the Member States gives the Institute the flexibility it needs to move resources between countries and
regions, in order to design and adapt cooperation initiatives intended to address national and regional priorities, facilitate
the flow of information and improve the dissemination of best practices.
The Institute has its Headquarters in Costa Rica, and Offices in 34 countries of the Americas, as well as an Office for Europe
located in Madrid, Spain. The Directorate for Strategic Partnerships works out of the IICA Office in Washington, D.C.
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account of the particular needs, problems and
conditions of the developing countries, so that they
may develop a competitive agriculture and
increasingly participate in international trade, we
must respond to the diverse and complex problems
that confront them in this field. To that effect and
under a single internationally negotiated Agriculture
Agreement, with clear objectives and guidelines,
participation would be granted to other international
cooperation agencies aside from the WTO in the
implementation of the commitments agreed. 
These organizations would be responsible for, and
would safeguard, the implementation of the actions
and measures that had been agreed upon within the
framework of the negotiations. The results of these
actions would be periodically reported to the WTO,
which would maintain a role of coordination and
monitoring and would ensure their compatibility
with the commitments assumed in the Agreement.
During the implementation period for the
commitments adopted in the Round, and as part of
the regular activities of the WTO’s Committee on
Agriculture, periodic exercises to evaluate the results
should be undertaken, in which those organizations
entrusted with supporting the fulfillment of
particular agreements would play a  key role and
participate decisively.
I wish to make it clear that I’m are fully aware of the
difficulties and of the technical, administrative and,
above all, bureaucratic complexities that a proposal
of this nature entails. I have more than thirty years of
multilateral experience, and have encountered
reluctance among organizations to share or cede
competencies to others, in areas that they consider to
be within their mandate or in which they have
acquired a sovereign right. I believe that these
attitudes are obsolete and are not in tune with the
enormous challenges of globalization. It is generally
the same Governments that form part of and finance
the organizations mentioned above. Coordinating
their efforts would be essential to finding concrete
solutions to the problems they face.
I’m convinced that, however difficult and complex
these problems may appear a priori, they may be
easily overcome if Governments have the political
will to resolve them. 
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